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F

or many people in the former communist bloc, the collapse
of communism has been a very mixed blessing. There is
obviously more freedom in most of these countries, but the
modest economic security on which so many people relied is now
gone and this in turn threatens democracy. This is not just a problem for countries in transition. The development of global capitalism and the dominance of market thinking have resulted in massive inequalities in many countries. In the United States, perhaps
the richest country in world history, one in five children lives in
poverty. As market capitalism sweeps the western and other parts
of the world, the problem of inequality will grow.
At the same time, the last half-century has seen the ascendancy
of the judiciary. This is the age of the judges. The establishment
in much of the world of constitutional courts is perhaps the most
prominent example of this development. These tribunals exercise
immense powers in many areas and thus have had to confront the
severe economic and social problems growing out of the transition
to a market economy. The broad jurisdiction of these tribunals is
due in part to the framework of these constitutions. Like constitutions elsewhere in the world, and unlike the United States constitution, East European constitutions contain extensive lists of social
welfare rights and governmental obligations, which have been
brought before their constitutional courts. These rights include the
right to basic subsistence, food, clothing, housing, health care, education, special protection for mothers and children, and the right
to work in its many facets, including the right to safe and fair conditions of work, to form trade unions, and to strike.
Whether economic and social rights should be included in
new constitutions has been hotly debated among academics. As a
practical matter, this is largely a non-issue now because almost all
the constitutions adopted since 1945 contain a relatively full complement of such rights, in a variety of formulations. To most U.S.
lawyers, however, including social welfare rights in a constitution
verges on the unthinkable. Partly this is because Americans have
been taught to think that constitutional rights depend on judicial
enforceability almost by definition, and most U.S. lawyers believe
that courts can enforce only negative rights, rights that deny power,
and cannot impose positive obligations upon government, which
social welfare rights do.
For purposes of discussion, there are two arguments against constitutionalizing social welfare rights: (1) whether they are judicially
enforceable; and (2) whether it is consistent with a free, democratic, market-oriented civil society to have such rights in a constitution.
Before turning to these questions, however, a preliminary
clearing away is necessary. Insofar as the issue is put in terms of the
contrast between positive and negative rights, it should first be noted
that many of the so-called social rights at issue are essentially negative rights. Some of these, such as the right to form unions, are
just variations of the right to freely associate, a traditional negative
right. The related right to strike includes the right to be free
from interference with strikes, also a negative right. Even so outlandish seeming a right as the right to a clean environment will
often call for just stopping public and private actors from polluting the atmosphere or the land, which is similar to traditional public-nuisance litigation.
Many of these social rights also are closely related to rights that
are indisputably negative. The most significant of these is the
right to be free from discrimination. Most countries already have
statutes creating rights to public health care, education, maternity
benefits, housing, social security, and similar benefits. In the
enforcement of such statutory rights, the right of putative recipients to be free from discrimination has been routinely invoked.
Discrimination is not the only possible abuse of these rights.
Established social programs may be administered in ways
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implicating other recognized “negative” rights. Benefits can and
have been denied to people because of their outspokenness, religion, or political affiliation. Such denials implicate freedom of
speech, religion, and association. This implication of negative
rights also applies to an interference with the right to work, and
can come up in the context of hiring, discharge, or unfair working conditions.
Moreover, some social rights that require courts to order affirmative remedial measures involve traditional judicial functions.
The right to safe working conditions is a good example. Courts
frequently enforce this right in statutory, common law, and even
constitutional cases.
The courts’ role in commanding specific positive action, and
not limiting themselves to prohibiting lawless acts, raises a larger
consideration. As the late Harvard Law School Professor Abram
Chayes pointed out 25 years ago, even U.S. courts have moved far
beyond the narrow roles they used to play, and are engaged
today in a wide variety of affirmative activities, ranging from
supervision of school desegregation, prisons, and nursing homes,
to monitoring corrupt unions. In all these cases, courts are doing
much more than merely saying “No.” Rather, they are actually setting standards, and in many cases requiring the expenditure of
public money.
It is this latter point—court-ordered expenditures of public
money—that raises the problems to which the criticism of constitutionalizing rights is primarily addressed. Suppose there is
no health care or housing or educational system. By what authority does a court tell a legislature that it must create such a program?
The exercise of such a power by a court raises issues relating to
continued on next page
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create a set of mechanisms and values that are beyond the power
of ordinary legislative majorities to change. Obviously, these
include the mechanisms for the distribution of power, which
separation of powers, budgetary priorities, and judicial compeare the most controversial everywhere and always. Further, contence. Moreover, it can induce conflicts within societies, for it
stitutions ensure that the fundamental values of society are also
involves reordering fundamental priorities, which historically
rendered immune to transient legislative majorities.
has fallen within the province of the representative branches. And
In the United States and in most western societies, we have long
suppose there is so little money that the programs cannot be estabaccepted the fundamental nature of the basic civil and political
lished. Won’t there be disillusionment with democracy if such
rights. Almost all societies, save the United States, have also recrights are not implemented?
ognized the prime importance of social rights. Far from such rights
This problem is more theoretical than real because almost all
being newly sprung from the paternalistic soil of communism,
modern nations already have public health care, education, social
these rights go back at least to former U.S. president Franklin D.
security, and other benefits. The problems that arise usually revolve
Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms, which were prefigured in his 1941
around the discriminatory or arbitrary administration of existing
State of the Union speech. They are enumerated in the Univerprograms with which courts have been dealing for a long time.
sal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant
Where healthcare, education, and social security programs do
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as in constitunot exist, should the courts order the creation of such a benefit
tions as conservative as the French Gaullist Constitution of 1958,
system? Americans wince at the thought that a court may order
and in the Italian, Spanish, Japanese, and virtually every other
a legislature to pass legislation or spend money, even though much
nation’s constitution. This is because social rights are inextricathat United States and other courts do requires the expenditure
bly intertwined with civil and political rights. Destitute hungry peoof substantial funds on pain of contempt or some other sanction.
ple don’t vote, and hungry people with no work to occupy them
By contrast, many European and other constitutional courts
have no patience with the slow, often tedious haggling among
do not seem at all reluctant to tell legislatures they must adopt
sharply differing groups, and the resulting slow progress that is
specific legislation. For instance, in the early 1990s the Hungarcharacteristic of democracy.
ian Court ordered the parliament to pass legislation protecting
Finally, it has also been argued that positive rights impose a
minorities and to establish a system of radio and television regconstitutional duty on governments to interfere with markets. But
ulation. Though each took a long time to enact, the court orders
the mere presence of such rights in
were ultimately obeyed. Such judicial
the Polish or Hungarian constituorders to a parliament to act, while
tions, and the enforcement of these
It is now clear beyond dispute that a
not common, are not unusual, and in
rights by their constitutional courts,
some cases, the court’s authority to
free society, dedicated to democracy and
hasn’t interfered with the Polish or
issue such orders is constitutionally
the rule of law, cannot be either
Hungarian free market reforms.
authorized.
Moreover, this is not really an arguA legislature may, of course, refuse
established or maintained if people are
ment against putting these rights
to follow the court’s direction. Will
hungry, homeless, sick, or uneducated.
into the constitutions, but against
this not weaken a court and indeed
having them at all, for there is no reathe rule of law itself, perhaps irreparason to think that it is the constitubly? Perhaps, but it is not likely. From
tionalization of these rights that is crucial. Regardless of whether
time to time, courts have been defied, but this has not necessarthe programs implementing such rights are in a statute adopted
ily impaired their prestige, so long as such defiance was isolated
by a politically created majority, or result from governmental
and not routine.
action fulfilling a constitutional duty, the interference with the
The most implausible argument of all is that non-enforcement
market is the same. The fact that the interference results from an
of some social rights will depreciate the currency of all or other
entrenched constitutional mandate rather than from an enactrights, and of the rule of law itself. There is simply no evidence
ment by a transient legislative majority does not affect the fact or
whatsoever that the denial or non-enforceability of some rights
degree of interference.
prejudices the enforcement of others, whether in the United States
It is now clear beyond dispute that a free society, dedicated to
or elsewhere.
democracy and the rule of law, cannot be either established or
Nor does it follow that the presence of rights in a constitution
maintained if people are hungry, homeless, sick, or uneducated.
requires that they be judicially enforceable for them to be meanIt is also becoming clear that, except in unusual circumstances,
ingful. There is also political enforceability. An obligation that is
freedom, democracy, and their associated civil and political
constitutionally mandated will have more persuasive force in
rights, are necessary for long-term economic and social stability.
debates over budget and other priorities than something that is
Few dispute the courts’ role in promoting the traditional civil and
completely discretionary with the legislature. Proponents of unipolitical rights. But there also must be fairness and equity in the
versal health care and those concerned about the poor and
distribution of society’s benefits, particularly those public beneneedy might have fared better in the health care debates if health
fits that are necessary to live a decent life, and especially during
care and welfare were considered matters of constitutional right.
periods of economic and social privation. Experience in Europe,
Nor does this mean that courts will second-guess the adeIndia, South Africa, and elsewhere demonstrates that while courts
quacy of governmental programs to effectuate such rights. In most
cannot abolish economic privation, they can provide at least
countries, courts exercise very little supervision over the details
some of the necessary fairness and equity. 
of such programs, so long as there is no discrimination or other
arbitrary application, and proper procedures are employed.
* This article is excerpted from “Should Social and Economic Rights Be
Nevertheless, questions remain: why should these rights be
Included In A Constitution?,” an essay for a Festschrift in honor of Proincluded in a constitution? Why should the relevant demands
fessor Helmut Steinberger. The essay was prepared for the Heidelberg
and needs not be left to the discretion of changing legislative
Germany Max Planck Institute of Comparative Public Law and Intermajorities?
national Law.
The answers to these questions depend on how one views a constitution. A constitution is more than a legal document. Drawing
** Herman Schwartz is a Professor of Law at the Washington College of
on a nation’s experience of the past and its hopes for the future,
Law and a Director of the Center for Human Rights.
it is the foundation charter of the national polity. Constitutions
Welfare Rights, continued from previous page
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